

# The United States Government Shutdown: A Game Theoretical Analysis

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# Introduction

The two chambers of Congress failed to reach an agreement over the government's debt ceiling

→ 1st of October 2013: government shutdown

Negotiations over the removal of the Affordable Care Act

16 days of shutdown 17rounds of votes

→ Republicans compromised

# The Framework

- Two players
  - The Democratic Party (Senate)
  - The Republican Party (House of Representatives)
- Assumption
  - Individual representatives will vote in accordance to the official party line
- Two-step analysis
  - 1. Before the shutdown (standard fixed payoffs)
  - 2. During the shutdown (dynamic payoffs)

#### 1. One-Off Simultaneous Game

Two possible simultaneous moves, for both players

- Compromise
- Refuse to compromise

... A Prisoner's Dilemma

## Players' Payoffs

	Republican payoff	Democrat payoff
λ	The Affordable Care Act is scrapped	Full funding for The Affordable Care Act
α	Reduced Affordable Care Act, retention of constituency support, and no 'loss of face'	-
β	-	Partial funding for The Affordable Care Act, but accompanying loss of public opinion (Failure to deliver fully on election promises)
3	Government shutdown	Government shutdown
δ	Full funding for The Affordable Care Act	No funding for The Affordable Care Act

### The Game Matrix

Utility values:  $\lambda > \alpha > \beta > \epsilon > \delta$ 

		Democrats	
		Compromise	Refuse
	Compromise	α,β	δ,λ
Republicans	Refuse	λ,δ	ε,ε

# 2. Infinitely Repeated Game with Decreasing Payoffs

Deteriorating economic conditions

→ Continously increasing pressure on players

→ Dynamically decreasing payoffs

# Assumptions (1)

• ε is now time-dependent

• BUT: its utility value diminishes at *different* rates for each player

 The decrease in utility is given by Φ for Republicans, and Ψ for Democrats

## Assumptions (2)

The factors  $\Phi$  and  $\Psi$  are themselves functions of:

E: The negative externalities to the economy created by the shutdown

P<sub>D</sub>: The negative public opinion directed at the Democrats

P<sub>R</sub>: The negative public opinion directed at the Republicans

 $P_R > P_D$   $P_R$  increases faster than  $P_D$ E is equal for both players

# Assumptions (3)

The Republican's rate of decrease  $\Phi$  is then:

$$\Phi f(E, P_R)$$
 E and  $P_R$  are negatively related with  $\Phi$  
$$\Phi < 0$$

And the Democrats' rate of decrease Ψ is then:

$$\Psi f(E, P_D)$$
 E and  $P_D$  are negatively related with  $\Psi$  
$$\Psi < 0$$

 $\Phi < \Psi$  in each game (that is,  $\Phi$  is more negative)

### The Game Matrix

Utility values :  $\lambda > \alpha > \beta > \epsilon > \delta$ 

$$\varepsilon^{\Phi} = \varepsilon + n\Phi$$

$$\varepsilon^{\Psi} = \varepsilon + n\Psi$$

		Democrats	
		Compromise	Refuse
	Compromise	α,β	δ,λ
Republicans	Refuse	λ,δ	$\epsilon^{\Phi}$ , $\epsilon^{\Psi}$

#### A. The Short Run

#### As long as:

- $-\lambda > \alpha > \delta > \epsilon^{\Phi}$  for Republicans
- $-\lambda > \beta > \delta > \epsilon^{\Psi}$  for Democrats

#### We continue to have:

		Democrats	
		Compromise	Refuse
	Compromise	α,β	δ,λ
Republicans	Refuse	λ,δ	$\epsilon^{\Phi}$ , $\epsilon^{\Psi}$

### B. The Long Run

Because of our dynamic payoffs

There will come a game N at which:

$$-\epsilon^{\Psi} < \delta \text{ or } \epsilon^{\Phi} < \delta$$


But as  $\Psi > \Phi$ 


$$\rightarrow \epsilon^{\Psi} < \epsilon^{\Phi}$$

Therefore: The republicans will be the first to reach


$$\varepsilon^{\Phi} < \delta$$







This brings an end to the shutdown And a new Nash Equilibrium [ Compromise, Refuse] With payoffs :  $(\delta, \lambda)$ 



Predictions depict the actual unfolding of the US government shutdown crisis

Can it come as a lesson for political parties in the future?



QUESTIONS?

THANK YOU!